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At the OAS General Assembly meeting held in Santiago, Chile in May, 2003 two 
candidates put forward by the US delegation for key human rights posts in the regional 
organization were voted down in secret ballots while a third narrowly escaped defeat. A 
strong resolution condemning human rights violations in Cuba, also supported by the 
US, did not garner the necessary consensus for passage. Although largely unnoticed, 
these minor setbacks for US policy towards the Western Hemisphere were symptomatic 
of a growing rift between the US and its immediate neighbours, reversing a decade long 
trend of increased cooperation and mutual understanding. 
 
Months earlier Chile and Mexico incurred the ire of the White House by not agreeing to 
support a resolution at the United Nations Security Council authorizing an immediate 
military attack on Iraq. Even Colombia, a close ally of Washington following broad US 
support for that country’s campaign against drug-trafficking and armed insurgency, ran 
afoul of the American administration’s global policy by refusing to endorse an agreement 
exempting US citizens from prosecution by the newly established International Criminal 
Court. These open disagreements followed a growing sense of unease in the 
Hemisphere over Washington’s perceived lack of constructive regional engagement. The 
Bush administration was criticized throughout the Americas for its unwillingness to 
spearhead international efforts to prevent the largest default in history in Argentina, an 
economic collapse that had ripple effects over the economic fortunes of other countries. 
It was also criticized for its tacit support of a move by the Venezuelan military to 
overthrow the constitutionally elected government of that country, a sharp reversal of the 
post-Cold War commitment of the US government to supporting democratic institutions 
and the rule of law as the cardinal principles in Hemispheric affairs. 
 
These setbacks responded less to deliberate reversals in policy than to a lack of 
concerted and coherent leadership in addressing problems in the region as the US 
narrowly subsumed all of its foreign policy objectives under the banner of the war 
against international terrorism. US policy towards the Hemisphere in the George W. 
Bush administration is particularly surprising given the fact that President had forcefully 
 stressed during the campaign that he intended to the Americas at the top of his foreign 
policy agenda, with a particular emphasis on redefining the bilateral relationship with 
Mexico. Indeed, Bush’s only full-fledged foreign policy speech during the campaign was 
devoted to Latin America policy, arguing that President Clinton had neglected the region 
by sponsoring international meetings with little substance, a direct reference to the 
Summit of the America’s process that was set in motion after Clinton obtained the 
approval of NAFTA. 
 
In the first few weeks in office President Bush did raise expectations that the new 
Republican administration was serious about placing the Western Hemisphere at the 
forefront of its international agenda. He welcomed President Vicente Fox at the White 
House as the first head of state to receive that honour signalling that he was prepared to 
go beyond trade in helping to redefine the relationship between the three countries of 
North America. At the Summit of the Americas meeting held in Quebec in the Spring of 
2001 he reiterated his commitment to strengthening the Summit process and, in 
particular, to meet the objective laid down in the First Summit of the Americas held in 
December of 1994 of signing a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas by the year 2005 
The new administration underscored that it would build on its predecessor’s commitment 
to democracy in the region by pushing for the adoption of a democratic charter within the 
framework of the Summit process and strengthen further the Clinton Administration’s 
commitment to helping Colombia defeat drug-traffickers and insurgents benefiting from 
the drug trade by expanding aid to Colombia’s immediate neighbours. 
 
In evaluating a US administration’s foreign policy towards a particular region of the world 
it is instructive to draw a distinction between three categories of policy. The first refers to 
‘day to day management.’ The dominant position of the US in the Hemisphere means 
that with every country in the region the US has a dense set of issues on its agenda, 
more so perhaps in countries with weaker political and economic systems where US 
influence is significant. To this ‘day to day management’ of bilateral matters that include 
trade, immigration, aviation, environment, narcotics, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, 
military to military relations have been added an increasing number of multilateral 
matters ranging from corruption to terrorism to education, the environment and 
sustainable development.  They in turn reflect greater cooperation among countries in 
addressing transnational issues and threats, contributing to a proliferation of multilateral 
diplomacy through ministerial and presidential level meetings. 
 
The second policy category is what can be characterized as ‘grand strategy’, policies 
that respond to a broad vision of foreign policy objectives with clear medium and long-
term objectives. It is typically associated with qualitative shifts in policy responding to 
broad national security challenges or fundamental redefinitions of US interests and 
goals.  The final policy set involves ‘crisis management,’ or responding effectively to 
political, economic and even natural emergencies that endanger stability and threaten 
national security. 
 
Grand strategy in the Western Hemisphere began with the development of the Monroe 
Doctrine and continued with the policy of Big Stick Diplomacy after the Spanish 
American War, the Good Neighbour Policy during the New Deal, and Cold War 
Diplomacy and the Alliance for Progress until the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Although it is too 
early to fully evaluate US post-Cold War policy in the Hemisphere, it does have elements 
of grand strategy. It began with a vision of economic integration in the first Bush 
administration that became reality in the Clinton Administration when the President went 
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 against the wishes of a majority of democrats in Congress and obtained the ratification 
of NAFTA with Republican support and later pushed for the negotiation of a Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas by the year 20005. 
 
Just as significantly, it continued with a vision of a collective action beyond trade—a 
commitment to democracy, human rights and multilateral cooperation on a range of 
issues that were channelled through the Summit of the America’s process, launching an 
unprecedented series of presidential and cabinet level meetings on issues ranging from 
anti-corruption initiatives to sustainable development to trade to the strengthening of 
governmental institutions and the rule of law. This brought an end to a pattern of 
unilateral US intervention in the region that last manifested itself with the forceful 
removal of General Manuel Noriega from office in Panama in 1991. Indeed, the OAS 
embargo of Haiti after the overthrow of Aristide, and the latter’s return to power under 
United Nations sanction with hemispheric involvement, was emblematic of a new post 
Cold War doctrine signalling that Washington was prepared to have proper relations with 
whomever was freely elected by its citizenry, whether from the left or right, in countries 
important to US interests –including Mexico–. 
 
The proof of an evolving grand strategy, however, is not in formal declarations, but in its 
implementation particularly when a country faces concrete foreign policy challenges or 
crises. In addition to Haiti, threats to democratic governance in Peru, Guatemala, 
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay were addressed by the Clinton 
administration forcefully. This was done within a multilateral context, on in which the 
Organization of American States moved from a body devoted primarily to the rhetorical 
defence of the concept of non-intervention, to a body prepared to evaluate the efficacy 
and legitimacy of electoral contests and hold nation’s and leaders accountable in the 
face of potential disruptions of the constitutional order. The US provided important 
leadership in managing crises, but its objective was not to reify unilateral actions, but 
develop the institutional basis for long-term collective action and cooperation in a Post-
Cold War context. 
 
If the Summit of the America’s process, the restoration of the democratic government of 
Haiti, and efforts to prevent democratic reversals embodied the core of the Clinton 
Administration’s ‘Grand Strategy’, it is also the case that the boldest and most politically 
risky step that the Administration took regarding Latin America was President Clinton’s 
‘Financial Support’ package for Mexico in the wake of that country’s uncontrolled 
devaluation in late December 1994. After the opposition Congress’ failure to approve aid 
for Mexico, the President made use of his executive authority and for the first time in 
history turned to the Exchange Stabilization Fund to provide massive support for a 
foreign country in financial crisis. The $20 billion pledged by the US became part of a 
$40 billion support package aimed at restoring confidence in the Mexican economy and 
preventing the spread of economic collapse in Latin America and other ‘emerging 
markets.’ The US response was necessary given the new realities of a globalized 
economy with rapid international capital movements. 
 
The US foreign policy establishment under Bush continued to handle the ‘day to day 
management’ of relations with Latin America well. The resources of the US government 
are considerable. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs in the Department of State 
alone has a larger budget than most foreign ministries and US embassies in the region 
are large and well staffed. In Bolivia alone, Embassy personnel amount to over 600 
functionaries. The motor pool of the Embassy in Mexico City consists of about forty 
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 drivers. And, in a typical meeting chaired by the National Security Council on an issue 
related to a country in the Hemisphere as many as forty participants might attend 
representing a dozen agencies and bureaus. Indeed, it was policy as usual that carried 
much of the administration actions in the first months as career people from the previous 
administration continued to manage bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Out of this 
process came the adoption of a democratic charter in the OAS General Assembly in 
Lima and an expansion of US assistance to Colombia by providing stronger regional 
support. Even the shift to a greater emphasis in Colombia policy to counter-insurgency 
support from a predominantly counter-drug focus represented policy continuity under 
different circumstances –namely the collapse of the peace process and President 
Andres Pastrana’s specific appeal for a shift in US engagement–. It is likely, in other 
words, that a similar shift as part of day-to-day management would have occurred in the 
Clinton administration. 
 
The Bush administration in its early months, however, appeared to be setting the 
groundwork for its own version of a ‘grand strategy’ when, working with Mexico, it 
indicated that it would be willing to go beyond a trade agreement that created the largest 
single market in the world, to a broad agreement on migration that would pave the way 
for the development of guest worker programs for Mexicans and the regularization of the 
status of millions of illegal Mexican immigrants in the US. Working level groups made 
considerable conceptual progress on the matter, much to the satisfaction of the Fox 
administration in Mexico which saw success on migration as an important example of 
the ‘democratic bonus’ that Mexico would obtain when it defeated the long standing 
ruling party. 
 
But, working level progress on immigration reform with Mexico soon ran into political 
difficulties with the domestic side of the White House. Despite the president’s own 
commitment to making progress with Mexico on the issue, reflected in his praise for hard 
working Mexican immigrants to the US, political advisers to the President, taking their 
cues from Republican leaders, including Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, made clear that 
the president could be hurt politically with his natural base if he appeared to be 
countenancing a policy that ‘rewarded’ illegal residents for ‘breaking US laws.’ Even 
before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the administration’s signature policy innovation 
regarding the Hemisphere was in serious doubt, although there appeared to be some 
room for consideration of modest progress in redesigning temporary worker 
programmes. This prompted Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castañeda to complain 
that Mexico was not interested in partial solutions, but was interested only in the ‘whole 
enchilada.’ Days before 9/11, President Fox in New York took the unusual step of 
criticizing the slow progress the administration had made not on immigration reform, but 
on other aspects of the ‘new’ agenda with Mexico, such as the ‘Partnership for 
Prosperity,’ which envisioned significant investment in Mexico to help redress the 
asymmetries of the two countries along the lines of policies followed by the European 
Union. 
 
After 9/11, any attempt to make progress on temporary worker programs was also 
derailed by administration officials concerned that the Congress would not look 
favourably at a policy designed to bring more people into the US for brief employment 
related stays. Curiously, ‘regularization’ was not revisited after 9/11 on security grounds 
despite the fact that the US has as many as ten million undocumented foreign-born 
residents whose true identities would help and not hinder anti-terrorism efforts. Although 
the administration has argued that immigration reform was simply rendered a moot 
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 question after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Mexican officials are 
aware of the fact that the Bush administration has not been willing to make the political 
commitment needed to obtain immigration reform. The President would have had to 
press his own party to get on board and risk having to do a deal primarily with members 
of the opposition, as Clinton did in embracing NAFTA, to get immigration reform through. 
The president’s commitment to a ‘grand strategy’ for the Western Hemisphere was not 
enough to take political risks to make implement it. 
 
Complicating the administration’s ability to innovate in Western Hemisphere policy was 
its choice of Cuban American Otto Reich for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs. Reich, with little experience out of Central America and the 
Caribbean, did not send a reassuring signal to countries that differ with the US on the 
Cuban embargo and chafe at an appointment made to satisfy the exigencies of Florida 
politics over progress in hemispheric relations. But more serious than the perceptions 
expressed on embassy row or in foreign ministries across the continent was the reaction 
to the appointment on Capitol Hill where Reich’s controversial role in defending the 
Reagan administration’s policy in Central America was viewed as anathema by 
Democratic Senators who succeeded in blocking his confirmation as Assistant 
Secretary. 
 
Rather than seeking a consensus candidate, the White House persisted with its 
nominee, finally appointing Reich to a temporary recess appointment that would have to 
be reviewed again by the new Congress. Despite the fact that the Republican Party 
regained controlled of the Senate, that body continued to object to Reich’s appointment, 
forcing the administration to give him a ‘face-saving’ and less consequential position at 
the National Security Council. Reich’s successor, who was still not confirmed by mid 
2002 more than halfway through the President’s term proved less objectionable to the 
Senate. But Roger Noriega, the former chief staff assistant to Senator Jesse Helms, did 
not generate much enthusiasm even in Republican circles mindful of the fact that 
previous Republican Assistant Secretaries were drawn from the ranks of prestigious 
business leaders with vast hemispheric experience. 
 
The absence of leadership at the State Department, combined with a waning interest in 
Latin America policy at higher levels of the administration, has contributed to a caretaker 
approach to hemispheric policy that failed to deal forcefully in ‘crisis management’, 
particularly with respect to looming crises in Argentina and Venezuela. 
 
In a deliberate effort to distance itself from what it viewed as an excessively proactive 
policy on the part of the Clinton administration in dealing with international financial 
crises, the Bush team took a decidedly ‘laissez faire’ approach to the looming economic 
meltdown in Argentina. Adopting a policy of ‘tough love,’ the US Treasury encouraged 
the IMF to insist on increasingly draconian cuts in fiscal expenditures to address 
ballooning fiscal deficits as a way out of the crisis. Although Argentine political leaders 
had clearly been at fault in condoning state borrowing particularly at the provincial level, 
the International Monetary Fund's policies were clearly pro-cyclical, only aggravating a 
crisis that was partly rooted in a fixed exchange rate regime that became increasingly 
unsustainable after massive devaluations in Brazil following the Asian financial crisis. In 
a classic Catch 22, public sector debt ballooned further not only because of Argentina’s 
uncompetitive position vis-à-vis its neighbour, but as significantly because of continued 
downgrading of the countries credit rating which only fuelled further its debt profile. The 
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 Treasury did not help much by suggesting that the problem in Argentina (and Brazil) was 
rooted primarily in corruption and mismanagement. 
 
Nor did US officials take active steps at a political level to try to work with the Fernando 
De La Rua government to seek a solution to the problems, hastily approving a support 
package that did not embody a broader economic and political strategy to resolve the 
crisis which was as much of confidence as of fundamentals. The administration was 
convinced that of the Argentine economy could be insulated from the rest of the 
continent. Although it is true that Brazil managed to avoid default and a dramatic 
economic downturn in the wake of Argentine devaluation that brought about a collapse 
of the banking system and plunged Argentina into a deep political crisis and the worst 
financial reversal in its history, Argentina’s fate has had a profound ripple effect in the 
Southern Cone and the Andean region, the dimensions of which will be debated for 
some time to come. 
 
In the case of Venezuela the US response to the attempt by Venezuelan military officers 
to overthrow the government of Hugo Chavez dealt a blow to the evolving framework of 
US hemispheric policy of the post-Cold War era which began in the second term of the 
Reagan administration and was strengthened through the management of crisis during 
Bush I and Clinton years. Although 12 presidents had not finished their terms of office in 
the wave of democratization that began in the early eighties in the waning years of the 
Cold War only one, President Aristide in Haiti was overthrown in an outright military 
coup. The others were either impeached or forced to resign from office having lost 
popular and congressional support and replaced by constitutionally sanctioned 
successors. In all such cases the US, working with its Hemispheric partners and through 
a renewed Organization of American States, did everything possible to dissuade the 
forceful overthrow of constitutional governments. 
 
By taking no steps to stop the military movement and quickly endorsing the legitimacy of 
an unconstitutional ‘provisional’ government the US seemed to be reverting to another 
era when the legitimacy of democratic institutions was a less important than the policy 
objectives of the incumbent regime. The US response in welcoming a ‘provisional 
government’ with no basis in Venezuela’s constitutional framework was not a carefully 
thought out policy option vetted at the highest levels of the US government. Rather it 
resulted from enthusiasm among political appointees in mid level positions in the 
administration with developments that could lead to the removal of a clear irritant in 
hemispheric relations, enthusiasm that obscured the broader implications of a 
democratic reversal in the Hemisphere for US policy. In the wake of the failure of the 
coup, the US did join the consensus of the Organization of American States in calling for 
the maintenance of democratic continuity in Venezuela. However, its actions deprived it 
of the moral and political leadership required to continue to constructively address the in 
Venezuela, one that despite the significant efforts of the Organization of American 
States and particularly of its Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, is far from fully resolved. 
 
In two areas the administration has made important headway: mutual security and trade. 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the administration successfully invoked the Rio Treaty of mutual 
security assistance gaining important political support for the US response to the attacks 
in its war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Although Mexico had, ironically, withdrawn from 
the Rio Treaty declaring it obsolete, both countries made considerable headway in 
securing the Southern border of the US. Across the region countries also improved 
cooperation in intelligence and counter terrorism matters. 
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It is in trade, however, that the administration has made the most significant progress. 
As early as the Quebec Summit President Bush assured his neighbours that he would 
obtain from the Congress ‘fast track’ authority to negotiate trade accords and pledged to 
conclude the FTAA and the bi-lateral free trade agreement with Chile initiated by his 
predecessor. This authority re-dubbed ‘Trade Promotion Authority’ grants the president 
the ability to negotiate trade deals that imply changes in US law subject to an up-or-
down approval by the US Congress that would refrain from amending the agreement. 
 
President Clinton, after his re-election, had failed to secure that authority when the 
Republican leadership of Congress insisted that he needed at least a majority of 
democrats on his side for them to go-along. Clinton discovered that after the 1994 defeat 
of the democrats who lost control of both houses of congress, it was far more difficult for 
him to gain support from democrats for his own free trade agenda. Democratic 
legislators now in the minority lost campaign finance support from business interests and 
were forced to rely more on labour for financial support. This contributed to the 
Democratic Party’s further shift away from free trade, aggravating the president’s ability 
to obtain ‘fast-track’ authority. 
 
Although lack of ‘fast track’ authority did not hinder progress on the FTAA in the Clinton 
Administration, which continued to work on the technical groundwork through and OAS 
led process, it did derail the Administration’s hope to conclude a separate FTA with 
Chile, initially promised at the Miami Summit. Chile was placed on the backburner of the 
Clinton administration’s trade policy until after the approval of Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations with China was approved by Congress. In his last months in office, President 
Clinton decided to offer President Ricardo Lagos the opportunity to negotiate an FTA 
with the US even though he did not have ‘fast-track.’ 
 
The Bush administration pledged to conclude the Chile negotiations and the broader 
FTAA process with ‘fast-track’ authority in hand. Making good on that pledge was harder 
said than done, however, as the enlarged Republican majority in Congress proved to be 
far less favourable to free trade than its predecessors. Particularly in the South where 
Republican ranks were swelled by democratic defectors, these defectors while 
embracing the more conservative Republican position on social issues differed with 
mainstream Republicans on trade as they sought to reflect the protectionist interests of 
their constituents. Thus, in order to get ‘fast-track’, or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
the new Republican administration was forced to turn to protectionist measures that 
even its democratic predecessor had shunned. TPA was obtained in the House after the 
administration pledged to insist on lowering tariffs for apparel and textiles only when they 
were made from US produced cloth and after the administration had slapped hefty duties 
on steel imports. While these were tactical manoeuvres on the part of Trade 
Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick to obtain TPA, they may come back to haunt 
overall progress on trade negotiations, including the FTAA, as members of Congress 
remind USTR of its commitments. 
 
True to his word Zoellick proceeded with the Chile FTA negotiations, bringing it to 
conclusion along with two other negotiations, Jordan and Singapore, begun by President 
Clinton. The Chile negotiations were at times difficult because the US wanted to make 
the Chile agreement a template for the FTAA including provisions on financial services, 
telecommunications and intellectual property. Chile, in turn, did not want to place into the 
agreement elements that were not relevant to its fairly progressive regulatory regime. 
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 Chile also would have liked the US to deal with US anti-dumping measures that 
Washington was not willing to place on the table. With the negotiations over and hopes 
for Senate ratification set for early fall, the US has made clear that the Chile agreement 
should not be viewed as a model for FTAA. 
 
While Zoellick was negotiating with Chile, it obtained from Congress a renewal of trade 
preferences for countries of the Andean region (Andean Trade Preference Act –ATPA) 
and decided to open another set of negotiations outside of the FTAA framework with the 
countries of Central America. US efforts on the trade front with the Andean countries and 
Central America have been interpreted in Brazil and other countries as a deliberate 
policy to open alternative multilateral negotiations aimed at pressuring Brazil to take a 
more accommodating position in the FTAA negotiations, lest the US embark on a series 
of alternative agreements that would place it in a stronger negotiating position. Some 
have argued that the US strategy is also a response to Brazilian insistence on seeking 
an FTA with the Mercosur countries and negotiate with the US as a block. 
 
While there is truth to these arguments, ATPA renewal also responded to pressure to 
continue trade preferences originally granted to countries facing significant threats from 
drug trafficking, an issue considered by the US to be a significant security threat. At the 
same time the free trade agreement with Central America responded as much to 
attempts by the US to garner regional support for its policies vis-à-vis Iraq as it did to 
specific trade imperatives. It is no accident that the only countries willing to join the 
‘coalition of the willing’ in the Western Hemisphere were Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Honduras and Colombia. 
 
But what are the current prospects that an FTAA will be achieved by January 2005? The 
difficulties are daunting. The current draft of the agreement worked out at the technical 
level includes 7,000 brackets, each denoting an item that needs further discussion to 
resolve. Washington, which now co-chairs the FTAA process with Brazil, remains 
committed to 2005 date, despite efforts on the part of countries of the Caribbean to gain 
more time, fearing that the signing of an FTAA before the successful conclusion of the 
WTO round would be highly detrimental to CARICOM countries that are counting on 
‘special and differential treatment’ they believe they can best extract from the WTO 
process. Brazil, while not pushing back on the date, has made it very clear that it is not 
prepared within this time frame to see a comprehensive agreement signed. For Brazil as 
well as other countries in the region the real objective in an FTAA negotiation with the 
US is to obtain access to US markets in agricultural matters, although Brazil is also 
concerned about US steel tariffs.   As such Latin America would like US concessions on 
agricultural imports and a modification of US anti-dumping rules as barriers to trade. 
 
But the US has made clear that such matters are best left to the WTO negotiations in the 
Doha round. The issue of agricultural subsidies and preferences is a matter the US will 
not discuss with developing countries without getting concessions from the Europeans 
and Japan on those items. On the other hand, the US wants to include in the FTAA 
process the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ such as investment, competition policy, trade 
facilitation and government procurement, as well as matters of intellectual property. 
Deputy USTR Peter Algeir has argued that the US-Chile FTA is the standard for 
progress in the US Central America negotiations as well as in the FTAA negotiations. 
Advancing on Central America after the concluding Chile would allow the US to 
negotiate agreements that would then confront Brazil with a fait accompli. 
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 Brazil, echoed by other countries, including those of the Caribbean, have argued that if 
the US is unwilling to discuss agriculture in the FTAA, it also prefers to shift to the world 
negotiation venue issues that the US has on its agenda, unless it were able to persuade 
the US to enter into direct negotiations with Brazil through the Mercosur plus 1 construct. 
Essentially this view holds that Latin American could benefit from developing country 
progress at the global level, whereas it could be jeopardized by a regional accord in 
which the US took key items off the table. 
 
It is also clear, however, that the Bush administration views progress on trade as an 
important political as well as foreign policy objective. The US presidential election will 
take place in November 2004, and the White House would like to be able to show that it 
has advanced on its signature hemispheric policy. The conclusion of negotiations and 
the announcement of the location of the FTAA secretariat in Miami prior to the US 
election are viewed by the White House as a plus for the president’s re-election hopes. 
This political factor may have contributed to the administration’s guarded receptivity to 
Brazilian entreaties that both countries lower expectations for the negotiations and seek 
an ‘FTAA light’ that would avoid contentious issues that would be transferred to the WTO 
negotiations. For Brazil this means focusing pragmatically on several specific market 
opening opportunities. A simplified FTAA could, for example, include disciplines on 
transparency in government procurement matters, without agreeing to open contracts to 
foreign bidders beyond a certain point. 
 
The problem with this approach is two-fold.  It flies in the face of the broader negotiating 
objectives of the USTR that has always insisted that it wants a ‘robust’ FTAA or none at 
all. Rather than clearing difficult issues in the FTAA in order to consider them at the 
WTO, the US would like to leverage the European countries by making progress at the 
FTAA level on several of its key issues while dealing with agriculture and antidumping in 
the broader negotiations. Secondly, the strictly market access approach runs into the 
politically sensitive question: which products will be affected. Brazil clearly has little 
interest at this time in an agreement that would not provide substantial entrée into the 
US of agricultural products. 
 
A key example is orange juice. Brazil currently processes 40% of the world’s oranges. 
Brazilian orange juice is subject to 29 cents a gallon tariff that effectively cripples its 
entry into the US. But, the Bus administration would be hard pressed to do anything 
about the orange juice tariff. The US is the second largest orange juice producer in the 
world, processing 35% of the world’s oranges, and its industry is primarily located in 
Florida. Florida orange juice interests have mounted a massive campaign, with the 
blessing of Governor Jeb Bush, the President’s brother, to make sure that any FTAA 
agreement does not contemplate the removal of the orange juice tariff. 
 
Any concession to Brazil on orange juice would thus complicate the President’s re-
election campaign in a state that is viewed as critical to that effort.  Any progress on this 
sensitive issue is simply out of the question until November of 2004, making it very 
unlikely that the FTAA negotiations can be completed in time for the January 2005 
deadline. And orange juice is only one product. President Bush carried both 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia, steel states that benefited from the administration’s 
additional tariffs. The White House is unlikely to want to rescind those tariffs before the 
election even if the WTO rules the tariffs are illegal, further complicating negotiations 
with steel producing countries including Brazil. Conceivably, the White House could turn 
around and seek a deal involving politically difficult concessions if, and when, the 
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 President is re-elected, a matter that does worry Florida orange juice interests and steel 
producing states. 
 
Complicating making matters is the widespread perception that the WTO negotiations 
are stalling. Despite recent efforts by Europe to modify its common agriculture policy, the 
Europeans do not appear anxious to announce in advance their negotiating position in 
the Cancun WTO negotiations in September. US officials have argued that European 
concessions on agriculture don’t go far enough in eliminating export subsidies and 
providing market access, arguing that the US subsidizes 23% of its farm sector whereas 
the European Union and Japan subsidize 40% and 60% respectively. Trade conflicts 
between the US and Europe extend to differences over US steel tariffs; restrictions in 
Europe to exports of US genetically modified foods; and disagreement over US export 
tax breaks. At the same time the US has made clear that it is unhappy with developing 
country resistance to relaxing restrictions on industrial goods and has threaten to 
retaliate against developing countries by eliminating preferential access to the US 
market. 
 
In sum, unless significant progress is made at the WTO that would allow for an early 
breakthrough in the FTAA process, a doubtful proposition, it is likely that the FTAA 
negotiations would be derailed by the timetable of the US election. In that case the FTAA 
will be postponed until after the US elections with a good chance that progress can be 
made if Bush is re-elected. Should Bush fail to win re-election and the democrats win the 
presidency, progress on an FTAA will depend on whether a democratic president 
succeeds in regaining control of congress, a probability that is less than even today. But 
the broader question refers back to the overall state of US Latin American relations. Will 
the Bush administration signal a change in the overall pattern of US policy towards the 
Western Hemisphere –marking a reversal to more unilateralist practices? Or will the 
force of events, and particularly the inexorable process of economic integration, reaffirm 
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